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I believe it will be very diffi  cult, or rather, impossible, for a man, 
who is accustomed to divide things according to specifi c marks, 
not individual diff erences, to draw the line betwixt the Orang 
Outang and the dumb persons among us. (Monboddo I, 297)
As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, 
the gaze called animal off ers to my sight the abyssal limit of the 
human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is 
to say the bordercrossing from which vantage man dares to an-
nounce himself to himself, thereby calling himself by the name 
that he believes he gives himself. (Derrida 381)
Race and culture have been analyzed and critiqued as “highly im proper” 
fi ctions and metaphors during the past few decades of critical race theory 
and postcolonial theory (Young 53–54, Hall 443). In this article I want 
to turn to the production of two other contested notions, the “human” 
and the “animal,” with a focus on their various signifi cations during the 
eras of slavery and Abolition. W ese terms predate the category of race 
as it is now used in critical race theory; indeed, they lay the ground for 
the deployment of race as concept and construct during the late eight-
eenth and early nineteenth centuries. Numerous natural histories of the 
period are concerned with the taxonomization of human and animal, 
either in order to produce clear distinctions between these two contested 
categories, or to blur those distinctions. My discussion will centre on se-
lected key works of the period, including Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte 
de Buff on’s voluminous Natural History, published between 1748 and 
1804, and Edward Long’s now notorious History of Jamaica, published 
in 1774. I want to focus on these two texts because of their enduring 
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cultural impact, and because in them the mutual dependence of notions 
of race and notions of the human and the animal emerge with particular 
starkness. As is well-known, Long is engaged in identifying and char-
acterizing diff erent species of humans: following this line of logic (or 
il logic), I am going to argue that race-thinking is a form of speciesism 
that is highly invested in notions of the animal and the human. Indeed, 
I want to insist that it is impossible to discuss the history of race and 
racism without taking account of formulations of species distinction in 
which the putative boundaries between animal and human were (and 
continue to be) asserted with varying degrees of emphasis.1 Humanness 
is fi gured as a continuum in  e History of Jamaica, and both Long and 
Buff on use spatial metaphors to describe the gradations by which man 
ascends from brute to civilized. If we were to adapt George Orwell’s 
ironic observation about equality in Animal Farm, we might say that 
for Buff on and Long, all humans are human, but some are more human 
than others. Human, as it will be clear, is a qualitative term: it is inter-
pellative, performative, and ideologically contingent. It is, as Giorgio 
Agamben notes and as I discuss below, not a specifi c identity but the 
ability to recognize oneself as human (26).
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century natural historians may have 
argued over where to fi x the border between human and animal, but as 
Marjorie Garber elucidates in her essay “Heavy Petting,” a new breed (so 
to speak) of “critical anthropomorphists” is currently engaged in inter-
rogating why it is that “science” insists on the existence of a fi xed bound-
ary between human beings and the rest of the living world. “Indeed,” 
writes Garber, “as one researcher points out, the desire to establish a fi rm 
borderline somewhere, anywhere, between humans and other beasts—a 
desire inherited from both Judeo-Christian religion and the philoso-
phy of Descartes—has resulted in a kind of scientifi c gerrymandering, 
a constant redrawing of boundaries to suit the intellectual politics of 
the time” (16). W e scientifi c manipulation of species boundaries has, 
as Garber intuits, a long history that extends back to Descartes and 
beyond. In A Discourse on the Method (1637), Descartes claims that both 
animal and human bodies are like a kind of “moving machine,” and he 
insists that despite the visual similarities between them, it is nonetheless 
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possible to distinguish an animal from a human “machine.” According 
to Descartes, this is because animals do not use language as humans do, 
and because their actions are mechanical, not conscious: “W is shows 
not only that animals have less reason than man, but that they have 
none at all.” Descartes concludes: “they have no mental powers what-
soever… it is nature which acts in them, according to the disposition 
of their organs; just as we see that a clock consisting only of ropes and 
springs can count the hours and measure time more accurately than we 
can in spite of all our wisdom” (47–48).2
Visual similarities notwithstanding, Descartes insists on the internal 
diff erences between animals and humans. Still, if Garber is correct that 
anthropomorphism is a kind of transference in which human properties 
are transferred onto animals (in her essay, dogs), her formulation never-
theless presupposes that there is such a thing as a “human” property that 
is defi ned and recognizable and ready to be “transferred” from human 
to non-human.3 Earlier commentators such as Buff on and Long are en-
gaged in debating precisely these kinds of questions: what is a human, 
for example, or how is it possible to distinguish human from animal, or 
how and where should species distinctions be drawn? (cf Monboddo 1: 
297, quoted above). 
Accordingly, Buff on and Long set out to delimit the ways in which 
animals and humans may be perceived, understood, and spoken about. 
In the course of their discussions, both of them use the body of the 
ape as an example, and like other eighteenth-century natural historians, 
both are fascinated and troubled by this borderline, hybrid creature that 
proves so diffi  cult to defi ne with any certainty. It would certainly be pos-
sible to argue that Buff on and Long (as well as other key commentators 
such as Rousseau and Monboddo) are engaged in the discursive prac-
tice of what Donna Haraway calls simian orientalism, whereby the pri-
mate body is both “a map of power” and “an intriguing kind of political 
discourse” (10). Haraway lays out the “transformative operations” that 
constitute the project of simian orientalist discourse:
Simian orientalism means that western primatology has been 
about the construction of the self from the raw material of the 
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other, the appropriation of nature in the production of culture, 
the ripening of the human from the soil of the animal, the clar-
ity of white from the obscurity of color, the issue of man from 
the body of gender, the emergence of mind by the activation of 
body…. Primatology is a western discourse, and it is a sexual-
ized discourse. (11)
As Haraway suggests in her inclusion of “the obscurity of color” amongst 
the binaries listed here, simian orientalism is a thoroughly racialized dis-
course, in which the boundaries of a gendered, white western self are se-
cured through the construction of a dark, furry, ape “other.” According 
to Haraway, nature and culture as well as sex and gender mutually con-
struct each other, so that one pole of each dualism cannot exist without 
the other (12). And yet, the orang-utan in Buff on and Long is neither 
othered nor gendered in exactly the ways one might expect, for while 
these two authors pay close attention to the similarities and relations be-
tween orang-utans and people of African origin (both authors are par-
ticularly interested in the putative visual resemblances between the two), 
neither of them argues that negroes are animals. If Linnaeus had dealt 
a blow to human pride by placing man among the primates as Homo 
sapiens, then it was at least possible to exploit this classifi catory proxim-
ity by insisting that some humans were indeed more human than other, 
diff erent species of human.4 Long’s speciesism similarly relies on a par-
ticular construction of the animal as sub-intelligent, untamed, savage 
and so on, but it is also based upon an acceptance of the proximity and 
similarity of animal and human, to the extent that Long insists that the 
orang-utan is human, and that negroes belong to this particular human 
species. 
Like the mulatto, the ape exerted (indeed, continues to exert) a mix-
ture of fascination and horror on white European (human) observers, 
perceived as it was/is to be unstable, hybrid, borderline, border-cross-
ing.5 As Diana Fuss observes, the human may be one of our most elastic, 
mutating fi ctions. W e dividing lines between humans and nonhumans 
have been repeatedly re-drafted to accommodate new systems of classi-
fi cation, which in turn represent diff erent political agendas. “Sameness 
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and not diff erence, provokes our greatest anxiety (and our greatest fas-
cination) with the ‘almost human’” Fuss writes (2, 3). Long’s negro and 
ape exert precisely this fascination, stretching as they do the border be-
tween animal and human to reveal its elasticity and contingency. In 
order to understand the imbrication of constructions of race and spe-
cies, it will be useful to consider some of the discursive functions served 
by the fi gure of the orang-utan in the works of Buff on and Long. Why 
is the negro retained as (mostly) human? What kinds of displacements 
occur from the humanity-conferring European observer to the African 
and the ape? Let me reassert that my exploration of these and other 
questions is informed by my assumption that racism and speciesism are 
discursively dependent and inseparable, sharing as they do the same his-
torical and ideological trajectory. In that case, it is impossible to analyze 
and to discuss notions of race, past and present without also engaging 
with the deployment of the animal as category and concept.
“Everyone knows of the turmoil into which European thought was 
thrown by the discovery of the great apes of Africa and South-East Asia,” 
writes Keith W omas in his Man and the Natural World: indeed, “since 
Vesalius [1514–64] anatomists had been embarrassed by their inabil-
ity to fi nd some respect in which the human brain diff ered in structure 
from that of the higher animals” (129). When Edward Tyson dissect-
ed an infant chimpanzee (which he called an orang-utan) in 1699, he 
demonstrated its essential resemblance to the human form. Prior to 
that in 1641, Nicholas Tulp had included in his Observationum medi-
carum libri tres an image of “Homo sylvestris – Orang-outang.” Just 
over a century later, in his “epoch-making” tenth edition of the Systema 
Naturae (1758), Linnaeus divided animals into six classes including a 
new group, mammalia, a category that joined humans to the animal 
kingdom (Schiebinger 383–84). Earlier editions had grouped humans 
in the order Anthropomorpha along with apes, monkeys and sloths, but 
Anthropomorpha was changed to primates in 1758. W is term was greeted 
with resistance by natural historians such as Blumenbach who continued 
to insist on separating humans and apes into distinct orders. Buff on was 
amongst those who complained that Linnaeus’s order Anthropomorpha 
lumped humans together with apes and sloths: in his opinion this “vi-
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olence” was wreaked on the natural scheme of things simply because 
“there was some small relationship between the number of nipples or 
teeth of these animals or some slight resemblance in the form of their 
horns” (qtd. in Schiebinger 388).6 
Other contemporaries of Linnaeus were less resistant to his taxo-
nomical “lumping together” of man with animals. In his Discourse on 
the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality Among Men (1755), Jean 
Jacques Rousseau wonders whether 
various animals similar to men, which travellers have without 
much observation taken for Beasts, either because of some dif-
ferences they noticed in their outward conformation, or merely 
because these Animals did not speak, might not indeed be gen-
uine Savage men whose race, dispersed in the woods in ancient 
times, had had no occasion to develop any of its virtual facul-
ties, had not acquired any degree of perfection, and was still in 
the primitive state of Nature. (205) 
It is not easy to distinguish between men and beasts and monsters, 
Rousseau concludes, since the only men “we” Europeans know are 
Europeans (209). “I say that when such Observers assert about a given 
Animal that it is a man and about another that it is a beast,” he writes, 
“they will have to be believed; but it would be most simpleminded to 
rely in this matter on coarse travellers about whom one might some-
times be tempted to ask the same question they pretend to answer about 
other animals” (211). 
Like Rousseau, James Burnet, Lord Monboddo cites the account of a 
traveller who claims that “the Orang Outang is not a man, but a species 
betwixt man and monkey” (1, 289; Rousseau 205), and like Rousseau, 
he claims that since the orang-utan possesses “the organs of pronuncia-
tion,” it is diffi  cult to draw a clear distinction between orang-utans and 
men (Monboddo 299, Rousseau 207). Whereas Buff on, like Descartes, 
makes the faculty of speech the essence of humanity, Monboddo as-
serts that “articulation is not natural to man;” rather, it is “an artifi cial 
operation.” Since language is invented and neither innate nor natural, 
there must have been a time when men did not speak. In that case, asks 
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Monboddo, what is the “distinguishing mark of diff erence” between 
men and orang-utans? 
I desire any philosopher to tell me the specifi c diff erence be-
twixt an Orang Outang sitting at table … and one of our 
dumb persons; and, in general I believe it will be very diffi  cult, 
or rather impossible, for a man, who is accustomed to divide 
things according to specifi c marks, not individual diff erences, 
to draw the line betwixt the Orang Outang and the dumb per-
sons among us. W ey have both their organs of pronunciation, 
and both shew signs of intelligence by their actions, with this 
diff erence, no doubt, that our dumb persons, having been edu-
cated among civilized men, have more intelligence. (293, 297)
Rousseau and Monboddo are aligned on one side of what Laura Brown 
has called “an anxious, even virulent debate on the topic of alterity,” 
whereby the notion of ‘man’ is problematized by its juxtaposition with 
or inclusion in other categories of being. W ese debates, as Brown rightly 
observes, imaginatively absorb one dimension of the European encoun-
ter with the non-European, while “the exploration of being in relation 
to humanity” involves a sustained (and sometimes uncomfortable) “in-
timacy with alterity” (223). Philosophers and natural historians of the 
period respond to this intimacy in diff erent ways. For some, ‘man’s’ lack 
of physiological advantage necessitates the identifi cation of something 
within which marks his superiority to the animals among whom he has 
been taxonomized. W is is Buff on’s “principle of thought,” which, he 
declares, apes do not possess, even though they might closely resemble 
humans (9:138). Long similarly diff erentiates orang-utans from certain 
(white) humans by arguing that they can neither think nor speak, even 
though they possess tongues and brains that look identical to human 
tongues and brains (2.363). Both philosophers seem to be following 
Descartes, who asserts that the diff erence between men and animals is 
marked by animals’ inability to use words, which is itself a sign of their 
lack of reason. “[W]e can … determine the diff erence between men 
and animals by these two means,” Descartes insists, “For it is a very 
remarkable fact that there are no men so dull-witted and stupid, not 
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even madmen, that they are incapable of stringing together diff erent 
words, and composing them into utterances … and conversely, there is 
no other animal, no matter how perfect and well endowed by birth it 
may be, that can do anything similar” (47). “Surely,” retorted Linnaeus 
in a note to the Systema Naturae, “Descartes never saw an ape” (qtd. in 
Agamben 23). 
In  e Open. Man and Animal, Giorgio Agamben identifi es the act 
of diff erentiating between human and animal as constitutive of humani-
ty, and he gives a detailed description of the crucially humanizing func-
tion of this distinction-recognition. It is worth quoting his account in 
full:
W e division of life into vegetal and relational, organic and 
animal, animal and human … passes fi rst of all as a mobile 
border within living man, and without this intimate caesura 
the very decision of what is human and what is not would 
probably not be possible. It is possible to oppose man to other 
living things, and at the same time to organize the complex—
and not always edifying—economy of relations between men 
and animals, only because something like an animal life has 
been separated within man, and only because his distance and 
proximity to the animal have been measured and recognized 
fi rst of all in the closest and most intimate place … Man has no 
specifi c identity other than the ability to recognize himself … 
to defi ne the human not through any nota characteristica, but 
rather through his self-knowledge, means that man is the being 
which recognizes itself as such, that man is the animal that must 
recognize himself as human to be human … W ose who … do 
not recognize themselves in the position that the Systema has 
assigned to man should apply the nosce te ipsum to themselves; 
in not knowing how to recognize themselves as man, they have 
placed themselves among the apes … Homo sapiens, then, is 
neither a clearly defi ned species nor a substance; it is, rather, a 
machine or device for producing the recognition of the human. 
In line with the taste of epoch, the anthropogenic (or … an-
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thropological) machine is an optical one … constructed of a 
series of mirrors in which man, looking at himself, sees his own 
image always already deformed in the features of an ape. Homo 
is a constitutively ‘anthropomorphous’ animal (that is ‘resem-
bling man,’ according to the term Linnaeus constantly uses 
until the tenth edition of the Systema who must recognize him-
self in a non-man in order to be human … In Linnaeus’s opti-
cal machine, whoever refuses to recognize himself in the ape, 
becomes one: to paraphrase Pascal, qui fait l’homme, fait le singe 
[he who acts the man, acts the ape]. (26–27)
Linnaeus’ category of homo sapiens is not a taxonomic given, notes 
Agamben, but an imperative, the sapiens summarizing the old adage, 
nosce te ipsum, to know oneself. Linnaeus does indeed insist that “[i]t is 
the exclusive property of man, to contemplate and to reason on the great 
book of nature,” and that only man is able to “form just conclusions 
from such things as present themselves to his senses, which can only 
consist of bodies merely natural. Hence the fi rst step of wisdom is to 
know these bodies and to be able, by those marks imprinted on them by 
nature, to distinguish them from each other, and to affi  x to every object 
its proper name” (Linnaeus, 1802 2–3). Unlike Monboddo, Linnaeus 
expresses no doubt about the readability of the marks imprinted on 
bodies by nature, so that to be human in this context does indeed in-
volve acknowledging humanity and animality through acts of looking. 
Linnaeus and Monboddo’s “marks,” as well as Agamben’s “optical ma-
chine,” suggest that humanity as such is an identity produced in the fi eld 
of vision, in much the same way that gender and race are performatively 
constituted through looking and enunciation (we might be reminded of 
Fanon’s “Look! A Negro!,” Butler’s “It’s a girl! … It’s a lesbian—and now 
we might add “It’s a human! … It’s an ape!”). W e human, as Agamben 
suggests, is merely that which sees itself as such, while homo sapiens is 
the optical machine that produces this recognition, both through a self-
knowledge of the animal life separated within man, and by gazing upon 
the deformed mirror of the non-human Other in which the trace of the 
so-called human is nevertheless contained. 7
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As we know, what confounded natural historians of this period, and 
what they sought to explain by recourse to the internal and metaphysi-
cal, was the discomforting visual similarity of animal and human forms 
in the body of the ape. Buff on accordingly acknowledges the “great pic-
ture of resemblances, in which the living universe presents itself as but 
one family,” before passing swiftly and somewhat anxiously to the “dif-
ferences, wherein each species claims a separate place” (9:134). It is the 
ape in particular that concerns Buff on, since his body “appears to be 
most perfect, that is, approaches nearest to man.” In spite of these simi-
larities, Buff on insists that apes 
require very accurate observations to distinguish one from the 
other … We shall fi nd in the history of the orang-outang, that 
if we should only attend to the fi gure, we might look on that 
animal as the one in which the ape species begins, or, that in 
which the human species ends; because, except the intellect, 
he is not defi cient in any one thing which we possess, and be-
cause, in his body, he diff ers less from man than from the other 
animals to which we have given the denomination of apes. 
(9:135)
Like many commentators (including Descartes), Buff on gets around 
the problem of morphological similarity by insisting that apes are only 
mimicking humanity, even though they might look human (which 
would seem to imply that apes must be looking at humans in order to 
imitate them). W us his acknowledgement of the physiological like-
ness of man and orang-utan is qualifi ed by an important caveat: “W e 
mind, thought and speech … do not depend on the form or organiza-
tion of the body. W ose are gifts bestowed on man alone. W ough the 
orang-outang, neither speaks nor thinks, he has a body, limbs, senses, a 
brain, and a tongue, entirely similar to those of man. He can counterfeit 
every motion of the human species, and yet cannot perfectly perform 
one single act” (9:135–36). W anks to his invocation of the divinely be-
stowed gift of intelligence, Buff on can safely conclude that “whatever 
resemblance there is between the Hottentot and the ape, the interval 
between them is immense, since the former is endowed with the facul-
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ties of thinking and speaking” whereas “the ape … has not the necessary 
principle [of thought]” (9:138). In that case, the ape “is in fact, no other 
than a real brute, wearing externally a human masque, but internally 
destitute of thought, and every other attribute which constitutes the 
human species” (9:149).
Apes thoughtlessly ape humans according to Buff on, just as Long will 
argue that negroes ape white people, a capacity for mimicry that con-
stitutes their taxonomic danger and, ultimately, the inferiority that ne-
cessitates the interval between animal and human.8 Whereas Buff on’s 
ape remains no more than “a real brute, wearing … a human masque,” 
Long’s simian is not so sharply distinguished from certain humans, even 
at the formal level of his text’s organization. Unlike Buff on, whose anal-
ysis of “W e Nomenclature of Apes” is situated at a fi ve-volume remove 
from his discussion of varieties of human species (the former occurs in 
volume nine of the ten-volume history, whereas the “Varieties” chap-
ter is included in volume 4), Long does not deal with orang-utans in a 
separate chapter or section; instead, he slyly segues from discussing the 
apparently bestial physical form of negroes into a description of orang-
utan behaviour, before concluding that there is not much diff erence be-
tween the two. 
In fact, Long has already asserted that 
there are extremely potent reasons for believing that the White 
and the Negroe are two distinct species. A certain philosopher 
of the present age avers ‘none but the blind can doubt it.’ It is 
certain, that this idea enables us to account for those diversi-
ties of feature, skin and intellect, observable among mankind; 
which cannot be accounted for in any other way, without run-
ning into a thousand absurdities. (2:336) 
Long’s emphasis on the visual is resonant of Linnaeus and Monboddo’s 
“marks” and Agamben’s “optical machine,” whereby it is presupposed 
that the diff erences between humanity and animality are produced 
through the (white subject’s) humanizing perception of them. Long ac-
cordingly inventorizes the visual “marks” of bestiality in black people: 
their “covering of wool, like the bestial fl eece, instead of hair … the 
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roundness of their eyes, the fi gure of their ears, tumid nostrils, fl at 
noses, invariable thick lips and general large size of the female nipples, 
as if adapted by nature to the peculiar conformation of their children’s 
mouths.” W eir bodies are infested by black lice, since “some say, that 
almost all animals have their peculiar sort [of lice],” their smell is “bes-
tial or fetid,” their manners are also “bestial,” they have no moral sen-
sations and do not cultivate the land, while “their barbarity to their 
children debases their nature even below that of brutes” (2:352–54). 
Only a few insignifi cant tribes know anything about mechanic arts 
or manufacture, “and even these, for the most part, are said to per-
form their work in a very bungling and slovenly manner, perhaps not 
better than an orang-outang might, with a little pains, be brought to 
do” (2:355). “When we refl ect on the nature of these men, and their 
dissimilarity to the rest of mankind, must we not conclude that they 
are a diff erence species of the same genus?” asks Long. After all, other 
animals are divided into myriad subordinate species and kinds, so why 
conclude that man alone is “undiversifi ed”? Horses, for example, re-
semble men, as do gibbons or orang-utans, which have some similar-
ity to the “ape-kind” but are closer to men in their physical make-up 
(2:356, 2:358). 
After quoting Buff on and Tyson’s descriptions of orang-utans, and 
citing (as Buff on does) La Brosse’s observation that orang-utans some-
times try to rape negro women (Long 2:360), Long concludes that 
when [the orang-utan] is compared with the ape, baboon, or 
monkey, he is found to have far more conformity to man than 
to those animals. W e Indians are therefore excusable for as-
sociating him with the human race, under the appellation of 
oran-outang, or wild man, since he resembles man much more 
than he does the ape, or any other animal … If he is a creature 
sui generis, he fi lls up the space between mankind and the ape, 
as this [i.e. the ape] and the monkey tribe supply the interval 
between the oran-outang and quadrupeds. (2:363)
“Ludicrous as the opinion may seem,” Long continues, “I do not think 
that an oran-outang husband would be any dishonour to an Hottentot 
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female.” Again, the ensuing “description” emphasizes the Hottentot’s 
bestial features, since, Long asserts, “they are more like beasts than men 
… Has the Hottentot from this portrait a more manly fi gure than the 
oran-outang?” He concludes: “W at the oran-outang and some races of 
black men are very nearly allied is, I think, more than probable; Mr. 
Buff on supports his deductions, tending to the contrary, by no decisive 
proofs” (2: 364–65). In sharp disagreement with Buff on, Long consigns 
Hottentots and “some races of black” men to Agamben’s mobile border, 
the intimate caesura where “man” and “animal” are “very nearly allied.” 
According to Long, they are like each other in external appearance, and 
what is more, they like each other sexually. Orang-utans and negroes 
“have the most intimate connexion and consanguinity,” Long asserts: 
“W e amorous intercourse between them may be frequent; the Negroes 
themselves bear testimony that such intercourses actually happen; and 
it is certain, that both races agree perfectly well in lasciviousness of dis-
position” (2:370). 
“Prominent in the discursive representation of the ape was the trope 
of interspecies miscegenation, in which the male ape, usually the 
orang utang, is said to carry off  the female African, often described as 
a ‘Hottentot,”’ observes Laura Brown in Fables of Modernity. “In eight-
eenth-century England,” she continues, “the sexual encounter of ape 
and human is a staple trope in the fable of the nonhuman being, off er-
ing a fertile instance in which a radical alterity is countered by a sudden 
intimacy” (236, 238). Brown argues that this “leap of affi  nity” gener-
ates the anxiety to separate European from non-European, and she is 
surely correct to note the reciprocal relation between what she charac-
terizes as “attacks” on human superiority, and the development of “ra-
cialist” thinking (239, 240). All the same, to ascribe “radical alterity” to 
the “leap” of affi  nity between human and ape may be a contemporary 
retrospective projection, since eighteenth-century commentators seem 
fairly uniform in their acceptance of the “likeness” between ape and 
human. Furthermore, the persistence of the so-called ape rape theme 
in this period is symptomatic and not simply causal; in other words, it 
does not merely generate an anxiety, but it refl ects one that is pre-exist-
ing and entrenched. 
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W e physiological similarities between negroes and orang-utans, along 
with the miscegenated unions cited by Long, Buff on, Monboddo and 
others, lead Long to conclude that “an orang-outang … is a human 
being, quoad his intellect; he has in form a much nearer resemblance 
to the Negroe race, than the latter bear to white men.”9 W is is part of 
the divine plan, since in his infi nite wisdom, God has diversifi ed the 
human species according to varying degrees of intellectual capability, 
positioning orang-utans as “the lag of human kind,/Nearest to brutes, 
by God design’d” (2:371).10 In the human hierarchy Long assembles, 
orang-utans constitute a “race,” a “kind,” a “type of man” (2.375).11 
“Guiney Negroes” are one step up; and from there “the human” ascends 
into lighter shades of complexion, and therefore more advanced degrees 
of “humanity,” “until we mark its utmost limit of perfection in the pure 
White.” Long expresses his confi dence in God’s racial design, insisting 
that “every member of the creation is wisely fi tted and adapted to the 
certain uses, and confi ned within the certain bounds, to which it was 
ordained by the Divine Fabricator,” and that black people have an al-
lotted “measure,” a “space, or degree, beyond which they are not des-
tined to pass” which “discriminate[es] them from the rest of men, not 
in kind but in species” (2:375; original emphasis). It may be possible to 
teach orang-utans to speak, since there are examples of talking dogs and 
learned horses; indeed, orang-utans might even surpass Africans in their 
intellectual attainments, as “Guiney Negroes” have shown no sign of in-
creased civilization in spite of their protracted contact with white men. 
And yet, “we cannot pronounce them [Guiney Negroes] insusceptible of 
civilization,” Long concludes, “since even apes have been taught to eat, 
drink, repose and dress, like men” (2:376).
W e racism of Long’s hypothesis hardly needs pointing out, and yet 
his argument is nonetheless somewhat extraordinary. Rather than ban-
ishing negroes from the category of the human to that of the animal he 
has broadened the former in order to include orang-utans as a race or 
species of men with whom negroes have much in common, both physi-
cally and ontologically. To return to Agamben and Derrida, assigning 
the space or degree or limit of civilization to orang-utans and negroes 
alike constitutes and consolidates Long’s white European humanity and 
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superiority. If this is a version of Haraway’s “simian orientalism,” it is one 
in which the white self is secure in his assumption that the dark, furry 
Other under scrutiny will challenge neither the representation of it, nor 
the space that has been allotted to it in God’s grand design. What we 
see here, then, is a paradoxical undermining—or at least, a revising—of 
the limits of “the human” on the basis of the putative visual similarities 
between negro and orang-utan, and the neurotic (because so frequently 
repeated) insistence on the miscegenetic unions between these two va-
rieties or species of man. Surely the ascription of orang-utan lust for 
negro women, along with the latter’s welcoming of the former’s “libidi-
nous and shameless” embrace is one of the most heinous displacements 
in Long’s History, eff ectively erasing as it does the spectre of white men 
“carrying off ” negro slave women for forced sex (2:383)? Strikingly, Long 
claims in a footnote that when “[a negro] lady conceived by her [orang-
utan] paramour,” it prompted the extension to women of the law against 
bestiality.12 Long’s contention that “the oran-outang and some races of 
black men are very nearly allied” contains a highly signifi cant biological 
assumption—namely that black women and orang-utans are capable of 
procreating (2:365)—whereas, of course, he notoriously argues that mu-
lattoes “produce no off spring, though in appearance under no natural 
incapacity of so doing with a diff erent connexion” (2:336).13 
If Long’s repeatedly invoked spectre of an orang-utan making off  with 
a black woman is a displacement of white male sexual violence against 
black women, then perhaps herein lies the reason behind his discursive 
retention of “the Negro” as “human.” To consign “the Negro” to a genus 
of animals would put many (perhaps most?) white men in Jamaica on 
the wrong side of the law against bestiality, while the mixed off spring of 
such unions would also throw white European species-status into doubt. 
Is this why Long humanizes the orang-utan while simultaneously bes-
tializing the negro? At the very least, his discursive move suggests that 
human and animal are indeed mobile, elastic fi ctions or borders. Like 
race, they are highly problematic ideological tropes with troubled histo-
ries, and we might do well to continue subjecting such taxonomies and 
the assumptions by which they are underpinned to sustained and care-
ful critique.
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Notes
 1 “Speciesism” is the term Singer uses to denote a prejudice or bias in favour of the 
interests of one’s own species against members of other species. He argues that 
objections to racism and sexism apply equally to speciesism (6).
 2 See also Fudge et al. for a brief discussion of the conundrum of “the human” in 
Descartes’ philosophy (3).
 3 Although she provides a fascinating account of Freud’s dogs, in this instance, 
Garber does not seem to be using the term “transference” in a strictly psycho-
analytic sense. Still, it would be interesting to consider the unconscious fantasies 
that are contained in anthropomorphic projections.
 4 See Haraway, “[Linnaeus] is noted [by contemporary scientists] for placing hu-
man beings in a taxonomic order of nature with other animals, i.e. for tak-
ing a large step away from Christian assumptions. Linnaeus placed ‘man’ in his 
taxonomic order of Primates as Homo sapiens, in the same genus with Homo 
troglodytes, a dubious and interesting creature illustrated as a hairy woman in 
Linnaeus’s probable source” (9).
 5 See, for example, Wiseman: “What is an ape? W is question troubled the natural 
philosophers of the Enlightenment just as much as the early modern mythogra-
phers because the ape was where the border between the human and its others 
was both maintained and dissolved” (215).
 6 I am indebted to Schiebinger’s account of Linnaeaus’s taxonomies. See especially 
384–88; see also W omas 130.
 7 Derrida reverses this humanity-constituting gaze in his essay, “W e animal that 
therefore I am (more to follow),” by considering himself naked from the vantage 
point of the look of a cat.
 8 W e fi rst citation of the verb “to ape” meaning ‘to imitate’ is 1632 in OED, 
although the phrase “to play the ape” is cited as early as c.1230.
 9 See Buff on 9: 156, Monboddo 1:335.
 10 Long is quoting Matthew Prior.
 11 Buff on also refers to apes as a “race” or “variety.” See Buff on (9.199).
 12 W is is still in the Jamaican constitution, along with “buggery.”
 13 See Long’s reference to the “goatish embraces” of “some black or yellow quashe-
ba,” resulting in the production of “a tawney breed” (2:328).
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